continued from http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui40.htm
By
Nowa Omoigui
Gowon’s Transition: Options for
demilitarization.
Shortly after Gowon’s announcement in 1970 that he planned to hand over in 1976, an internal debate erupted within the bureaucracy regarding options for the country. The four main options canvassed by policy analysts and advisers were,
A military-civilian combination – such as the Diarchy proposed by former President Nnamdi Azikiwe in which elected civilians would run the government but the military would have veto in a partnership.
Full elected civilian regime
Full military rule (i.e. status quo )
It must be recalled, however, that this would not
be the first time talk of demilitarization would occur in the Gowon regime.
During a broadcast on November 30, 1966, Gowon had said,
“As soldiers, my colleagues and I are ready to
go back to the barracks any day. But the work of national reconstruction must be
completed, public confidence in our institutions restored; and civilian leaders
demonstrate to the nation that they are ready to take over and project a better
image of the country than it had just before January, 1966……..”
By “national reconstruction,” what Gowon meant at the time was as follows:
Resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons.
Preparation of the Second National Development Plan.
Continuation of the “fight against corruption in public life.”
Preparation of a new constitution.
Just over six months later, during his inaugural
address to the first civilian members of the federal executive council on
June 12, 1967, Gowon said:
“Your appointment to the Federal Executive
Council marks a turning point in the history of the military regime. We are now
embarking on the road back to full civilian rule…... Left to me alone, I would
have brought civilians into the Federal Executive Council in accordance with my
promise to the nation long ago. But the mention of civilian rule was one of the
nightmares of Lt. Col. Ojukwu. One of the many concessions I had to make to him
was to keep civilians out of sight. He told me many times that we will be
pushing him out of the Federation if I brought civilians into the Federal
Executive Council. He always pleaded with me that he would find it very
difficult to keep his own civilians and ex-politicians in the backroom if their
counterparts elsewhere were to help me in running the Federal Government in
Lagos.…Any neutral observer who has recently been to Enugu knows that Ojukwu was
bent on forcing the East out of the Federation to satisfy his personal political
ambitions….…I had to assume full powers and declare a state of national
emergency to deal with the situation when it became clear that to me that no
concession could stop Ojukwu from trying to secede; and Lt. Col. Ojukwu declared
his secession in Enugu three days later..…..When the country has been reunited
without Ojukwu, the Armed Forces will hand over to civilians chosen by the
electorate….”
On July 1st, 1967 in another
last minute public offer to avoid war, the federal government listed six
conditions. Interestingly, these included,
“2. Public announcement of acceptance and
recognition of Federal Government authority over Eastern Nigeria by the former
Military Governor, East, Lt. Col. Ojukwu or any other Eastern officer…(italics
mine).
4. Acceptance of appointment of Civilians as
Commissioners into the Federal Executive Council and State Executive Councils….
6. Agreement that constitutional talks on the
future of Nigeria will be held by the duly accredited and equal representatives
of the twelve states.” (Some might interpret this – in modern day parlance - as
a “national conference”)
Nevertheless, Ojukwu ignored all of these
“conditions” and the war broke out five days later – which ended when another
Eastern officer, Lt. Col. Effiong (then a Biafran Major General) surrendered
following Ojukwu’s flight into exile.
Barely two days after the war was formally
declared over, one of the prominent politicians in the Gowon cabinet, Chief
Anthony Enahoro, observed poignantly that:
“This was a military-military operation, and so I
would like to make it quite clear there have been no peace negotiations of any
kind and there will be no peace negotiations of any kind. When the time comes,
the people of Nigeria (italics mine) will get together and work out their
future.”
The departure of two prominent civilian members of
the Gowon cabinet at that time reflected some of these underlying dynamics. In
June 1970, Alhaji Yahaya Gusau, then Federal Commissioner for Economic
Development and Reconstruction, resigned over infighting with his “super
permanent secretary”, Allison Ayida, who he felt was bypassing him with Gowon’s
approval. Virtually one year later, on June 30, 1971, Chief Obafemi Awolowo,
Federal Commissioner for Finance and Vice Chairman of the Federal Executive
Council resigned, some say to prepare for politics, while others say it was to
protest certain early signals that civilian rule was increasingly becoming a
mirage.
Nevertheless, Gowon did lift the ban on politics
in 1972. Pressure groups like the intelligentsia, press, and trade unions called
for a rapid return to multiparty democracy. But Awolowo's call for Nigeria to
become a "democratic socialist" state made many in the military uncomfortable.
Demands for new states were also prominent and the debate became bitter. When
former President Azikiwe, for example, proposed an increase from 12 to 22
states, he was attacked by East Central Administrator Ukpabi Asika, who referred
to ex-office holders like Azikiwe as “ex-this”, “ex-that”, and “nattering nabobs
of negativism.” In North Central State, acrimony between the old Zaria and
Katsina provinces was also highly acrimonious. Such fierce exchanges made Gowon
nervous. In an interview with Elaigwu, he would later explain that he did not
want to take decisive (or perhaps precipitous) action on the States issue
because,
“…..there are some things whose nut you will
find you cannot crack at this time; time will help sort out the issue.”
Nevertheless, under the guise of consultation,
conferences on “national policy” were held at different locations in the
country, attended by elements of the military, traditional, bureaucratic and
intellectual elite. It was at one such conference held in Zaria in October
1972 that the first hint of a crack in the military became subtly apparent.
According to Professor Billy Dudley, then Lt. Col. Shehu Musa Yar’Adua,
Commander of the 9 Infantry Brigade (and a protégé of Brigadier Murtala
Mohammed) openly opposed a “National Movement” model (with Gowon at the top).
He openly said that an officer may well be able and competent but would be
useless as a commander if he could not win the loyalty of his men. Little did
those in the audience appreciate at the time that the dark complexioned, soft
spoken, young Lt. Col. from the “far north” would later mastermind a coup that
would remove Gowon from office.
Meanwhile, Gowon’s “Bureaucratic Knights” (as
former President Shagari describes them), carried on relentlessly. In an
address to the Nigerian Economic Society in 1973 titled “The Nigerian
Revolution, 1966-76”, Allison Ayida said,
“…In the light of our recent history, there is
equally convincing evidence to demonstrate that a national leadership acceptable
to the country as a whole will not emerge in 1976 through an autonomous election
like a deus ex machina.”
Although he was speaking in the context of
justifying a ‘national movement’, there was good reason for Ayida’s gloomy
forecast. Opposition had obviously been gathering since 1970 to various
aspects of the nine-point plan, bringing together a disparate group of special
interests. For one, former politicians were eager to return to the good old
days prior to 1966. Any delay – for whatever reason - was unwelcome. University
based intelligentsia were envious of the new status (and access) being enjoyed
by senior civil servants in the “military-bureaucratic” alliance. They were
humiliated (and alienated) by the ultimatum given them by Gowon during the
lecturers’ strike of 1973 to succumb or be forcibly packed out of University
Housing by soldiers. Within the larger community of intelligentsia, ‘far north’
elements in particular were alleged to have become increasingly concerned about
“southern influences” around Gowon who, in any case, had long been viewed in
some quarters as being a “Christian missionary.” It did not matter that Gowon
had appointed the deserving and highly competent Alhaji Abdul Aziz Atta as the
Secretary to the FMG and Head of the Civil Service to replace Ejueyitchie when
the latter retired. Fully one third of all Federal Permanent Secretaries came
from the Midwest (now Edo and Delta States). That they had helped save Nigeria
in time of crisis was now a distant consideration and in any case, some of the
compromises of the civil war era were now deemed to have since outlived their
usefulness.
Further, the Sahel drought of 1972-74, said to be
the worst since 1914, badly affected the ‘far north.’ Although he responded
strategically by supporting heavy federal and state investments in irrigation
schemes and reforestation, some accused Gowon of responding too little and too
late. In the opinion of some, he did not even bother to visit the region to
commiserate until late 1973. Paradoxically, in a meeting that was arranged to
smooth things over, Gowon came across to some of these men as being “high
handed” and “arrogant.” According to Billy Dudley, such men included Dr. Mahmud
Tukur, Ibrahim Tahir, Suleiman Kumo, Jibril Aminu, Mohammed Uwais, among
others. According to this hypothesis, with the support of some old
‘native authority’ functionaries, some members of the so-called “far
northern intelligentsia” eventually hooked up with some of “far north”
element in the military (some of whom had personal grudges and agendas).
They allegedly used the platform of common old school ties at Barewa College and
Government College, Keffi. Thus, through what later became known as the “Kaduna
Mafia”, they allegedly undermined not only the option for a one-party state
under a civilianized Gowon (surrounded by a clique of “super-permanent
secretaries” from the far south), but also the notion of continuing military
rule under his tutelage.
It was clear by early 1974, therefore, that the
one-party idea (under Gowon) was not going to sell (and Gowon himself says he
was not interested in it). It was also evident – from the national policy
conferences - that the concept of a Dyarchy had little public support. It was
left, therefore, for Gowon to choose from between a return to full civilian rule
and a continuation of the status quo. Although there were already undercurrents
against him, it was his decision on October 1, 1974 to opt for a continuation of
the status quo (and renege on his promise to leave in 1976) that unmasked
full-scale efforts to get him out of office – by any means necessary.
A coup is a political event. It requires a
motive, the means by which the motive can be fulfilled and the opportunity to do
so. Let us place the political and economic substrate in context.
Gowon basked in international and national glory
immediately after the war. Although some writers are quick to dismiss his time
in office with all sorts of epithets, the truth is that he (and many of his
governors) achieved many great things and established many important foundations
for the country (and their states). Some of these foundations have since fallen
by the wayside, ignored or even undermined in the feeding frenzy of some of the
leaders who came afterwards. But like many leaders before and after him, he
also faced some serious problems and made some very serious errors. Among many
key events of the Gowon era were the following:
1.
The switch from ‘left hand drive’ to ‘right hand drive’ bringing in
advantages in the regional and world economy.
2.
In line with decimalization, the currency switches, on January 1st
1973, from ‘Pounds and Pennies’ to ‘Naira and Kobo’ and the currency
diversification of Nigeria’s external reserves.
3.
Development of a Federal Low Cost Housing Scheme – albeit beyond the
reach of many.
4.
Gowon maintained very strong support for African liberation movements and
kept Nigeria’s role in the nonalignment movement. In September 1970, he
speedily patched up relations with those African countries that had supported
Biafra during the civil war. On February 10, 1971, he implemented a strategic
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.
(Gowon subsequently visited China in September 1974.) Nigeria remained a strong
member of the Commonwealth, although difficulties arose with Britain’s
Conservative Party over its decision to sell weapons to Apartheid South Africa
and its application for membership of the EEC.
5.
The Gowon government made a decision in 1971 to join OPEC – the
Organization of Oil Exporting Countries.
6.
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 4 of 1972 (better known as the
“Indigenization Decree”). Although well intentioned by patriotic motives, this
decree, which was formally promulgated in April 1974, was plagued by allegations
of ethnic and insider favoritism and corruption and may even have been premature
(in the view of some) given the underdevelopment of appropriate business ethic
among indigenous entrepreneurs. Many shares were acquired for little or no
value, feeding into the consumptive (rather than productive) mentality of many
Nigerians. Twenty-two (22) activities were exclusively reserved for Nigerians
and international commercial banks were to reserve at least 40% of all loans and
advances to Nigerian businesses. Because of the alleged ethnic distribution of
those who were said to have benefited the most, there is – to this day - a
residual bitterness in certain parts of the polity about the “Indigenization
Decree.” Nevertheless, at the time the decree was conceptualized, foreigners
owned about 70 percent of commercial firms in Nigeria. It was not the kind of
statistic any government could ignore.
7.
Establishment of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) via Decree No.
24 of 1973. In spite of its subsequent financial and organizational problems,
most people view the establishment of the NYSC as one of the highlights of the
Gowon era. Interestingly, though, at the time, students (allegedly prompted by
politicians) went on a nationwide strike to protest it. But this was not the
first brush between the Gowon regime and students. In 1971, Kunle Adepeju, a
student at the University of Ibadan died of gun shot wounds during
demonstrations against the University administration.
8.
Hosting of the Second All-African Games in Lagos in 1973 at which John
AkiiBua of Uganda broke the world record in the 400 meters hurdles.
9.
Establishment of the Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, and the Bank of
Commerce and Industry. These were also well intentioned, designed to assist
Nigerian business and agricultural class with sources of capital. However, many
Nigerians chose to divert such agricultural and commercial loans and grants to
other pursuits.
10.
Following a successful summit in Addis Ababa, General Gowon became
Chairman of the OAU from 1973 to 1974. It was as OAU Chairman that he
coordinated the solidarity decision of many Black African states to sever
diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1973 October Yom Kippur War.
11.
Along with President Eyadema of Togo, the establishment of ECOWAS in May
1975. The Nigeria Trust Fund at the African Development Bank – which finances
projects in poorer African countries was also a child of the Gowon regime.
12.
Conceptualization and initiation of the Universal Primary Education (UPE)
Scheme. Although plagued by subsequent problems of inadequate planning and
projection (in part due to expectations of bigger Oil revenues and a slip of
tongue during a public rally), the intention was laudable.
13.
Establishment of the National Universities Commission (NUC) in 1974.
14.
Construction of massive road networks and conceptualizing a massive
program of investments in public infrastructure.
15. Planning for the second World Black and
African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) was initiated by the Gowon regime
but the event was postponed until 1977 by his successors, citing administrative
hitches and the need to scale it down.
Let us now review some of Gowon’s more serious
‘misadventures’. It must be noted, however, that many of these are a matter of
opinion.
Although it was one of the few items among his
“nine points” that he pursued with vigor, perhaps the most serious political
misadventure of the Gowon era was the 1973 census. Results released in May 1974
(against the advice of the Census Commission Chairman) indicated that Nigeria's
population (supposedly 79.76 million) had increased by 43.3 percent since
1963, far more than any other any developing country. With 64 percent of the
reported population, the ‘North’ had registered an increase of 72.4%
since the1963 result that was controversial even then. The Midwest had
increased in population by 27.6 percent, and the East by 11 percent, while
the West decreased by 6.0 percent. Lagos increased by 71.5
percent. In spite of the ban on political activity (which Gowon had
reinstituted in light of public acrimony about States creation) prominent
Nigerians went public with angry protests about the results. “It just can’t be
true” said Chief Awolowo of the West in a major speech. Others, including some
military officers from areas that “improved” their scores, made public
statements praising the count. Gowon did try – unconvincingly – to reassure the
nation that post-enumeration check (but not a recount) would be conducted and
that the final result would be released in October 1975.
From the standpoint of the military the census
provided a way to increase the defence budget without the knowledge of the
public. According to Oluleye, because soldiers were involved in the exercise,
“finance for movement and “Basha” Barracks construction was made available from
the census account.” When the exercise became controversial, however, the Army
found its image smeared by its involvement. One of the unintended consequences
of the Census debacle, coming at the same time as the Tarka and Gomwalk
corruption scandals, was that it created an atmosphere for politicians to begin
having informal discussions with elements within the military.
The effect of wartime economic policies on wartime
trade union tensions and post war inflation has already been alluded to. But
certain government actions after the war, although intended to increase
real earning power in light of inflation, paradoxically encouraged even
more inflation. In January 1971, Gowon, reeling under accusations that his
wartime actions (rather than international economic dynamics) were responsible
for inflation, implemented the recommendations of the Simeon Adebo Wages and
Salaries Commission and increased the salaries of workers. Surprisingly, labor
unrest resulted, some say aggravated by the not so tactful announcement by
Information Commissioner Chief Enahoro that those private companies that had
increased their salaries at least once since 1964 would be exempted. Following
the second and final report of the Commission, however, a subsequent
controversial pay raise (with arrears) was again approved by the SMC in October
1971.
In September 1974, Gowon accepted the report of
the Jerome Oputa Udoji panel on public service organization, management and
remuneration. However, when put into effect in January 1975, only the salary
component of the report was implemented. The rest of the report was allegedly
ignored. According to then Federal Finance Commissioner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari,
even the payment of salaries was carried out against guidelines recommended by
Udoji and the Federal Ministry of Finance. Civil Servants who drafted the
government white paper on the Udoji award apparently skewed it to favour the
civil service, thus igniting a wave of labor unrest because of the private and
public sector discrepancies, exploited, some say, by disgruntled politicians and
scheming soldiers. Lump sums were paid in full along with up to nine months of
arrears – fueling inflation as workers went on a spending spree.
Because there was also widespread unemployment,
inequities in distribution of wealth became apparent, increasing social tension.
What had happened was that the process of transition from an agrarian economy of
the sixties to a petro-naira based industrial-urban economy of the seventies had
resulted in massive rural-urban drift in search of better remuneration. Added
to this was the effect of more and more “westernized” school graduates entering
the labour market at a time the national industrial and agricultural base had
not yet expanded sufficiently to absorb them – and huge politically unpopular
defence expenditures were being sustained in the absence of demobilization. The
unemployment problem was particularly severe in the East, still recovering from
the war and the initial residual reluctance of skilled Igbo to venture outside
the East for jobs.
In early 1975 oil production fell steeply because
of a sudden decline in world demand, resulting in lower prices and shortfalls in
revenue expectations. Although prices recovered somewhat later in the year
after an intervention by OPEC, the temporary economic gloom – and alleged
mismanagement that caused it – combined with the widespread “Udoji” industrial
action in May and June which brought the country to standstill, helped in
rationalizing the overthrow of the government in July.
During the civil war, Port Harcourt was closed to
foreign shipping. Lagos (Apapa) was the only port available for the country’s
predominantly military needs. Hence the government acquired the ports of Warri,
Burutu and Calabar along with Koko and Bonny. After the war, non-military
goods flooded the ports, which thus had to be quickly rehabilitated.
Unfortunately the rehabilitation carried out was grossly insufficient to meet
Nigeria’s unanticipated and explosive petrodollar economic needs. Cargo traffic
far exceeded the capacity of the Ports and the sixties era narrow roads and
bridges at that time were collapsing under the weight of road haulage. Rail
haulage did not meet expectations either. Containers were, therefore, being
offloaded at the port creating huge delays in transition. All sorts of
measures were adopted to remedy the situation but they proved insufficient.
Therefore, Gowon appointed Brigadier Adekunle as the Military Port Commandant of
Lagos with full emergency powers to decongest the port.
Unfortunately, cargo congestion was not the only
problem. Wartime Import embargoes had been lifted and foreign exchange controls
relaxed. The demand for cement and other building materials was astronomical,
fueled in part by the Udoji salary awards. Under pressure from the military the
government committed itself to a massive Barrack building program and thus
ordered 16 million metric tonnes of cement for the MOD alone, amounting to 80%
of the country’s total cement import.
Although all Nigerian Ports combined could
only handle 6.5 million tonnes of general cargo per annum, the government
had expected ALL 16 million metric tonnes for the MOD delivered within twelve
months!
By April 1975 about 105 ships, were waiting on the
high seas for berthing facilities. By June the number had climbed to 455, of
which 300 vessels were carrying cement. Forced to wait an average of 180 days
before berthing, freight surcharges of 30 % to 100 % were being paid per ship
with the effect of raising import prices. At the same time Nigerian
agricultural exports suffered. It has been estimated that the Government paid
$ 4100 per day in demurrage for each cement vessel delayed over ten
days.
In addition, border incidents between states
popped up from time to time. This remains an ongoing issue.
This is a difficult area because of the lack of
complete information from all concerned. The late Major General JN Garba has
written his own opinions of Gowon’s foreign policy ‘misadventures’. However,
General Gowon has rarely gone on record to explain his thinking in detail on
many less well-known areas of foreign policy during in his time. Thus, what has
been labeled negatively by some of his critics may simply be the direct result
of lack of information. I am in a position to comment in detail on some of
them, like the Cameroon border problem.
Some of Gowon’s close lieutenants – like the late
Vice Admiral Wey – were extremely tight lipped about their experiences in
government. But the Admiral did, on more than occasion before he died, express
regret that those who took over from their government in July 1975 never
bothered to seek policy clarity from them directly on any issue. The
Adedeji panel of 1975/76, which reviewed foreign policy since independence, took
no submissions from Gowon or Wey or Hassan.
Examples include details of how a planned
mercenary invasion of Equatorial Guinea, for purposes of reviving Biafra, was
thwarted and whether there were any trade-offs. Then there was the case of
personal diplomacy in his pledge to assist Hamani Diori with Nigerian troops
during a coup attempt in 1972. Others include Gowon’s decision – in 1975 - to
pay the salaries of civil servants in Grenada and train their Police force at
Nigerian expense.
Gowon’s meetings with President Ahidjo of Cameroun
were aimed at resolving the demarcation of the maritime boundary between
the two countries. The two men never discussed the Bakassi peninsula.
It was Nigeria’s first Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa that acknowledged the
status and Camerounian sovereignty of the peninsula based on the facts at the
time of Nigerian Independence. The land border (near the sea) was demarcated
at that time (1960) and the beacons are still there. Gowon met with Ahidjo on
April 4th, 1971 and reached a controversial agreement (as
advised by Surveyor R Oluwole Coker) on the maritime delineation up to three
miles offshore. At Kano on September 1st, 1974, they declared
a 2-kilometer corridor on either side of the line joining Fairway Buoy to Buoys
Nos. 1, 2, 3 existing on Chart 3433 as an area free from oil prospecting
activity. They also agreed – on Ahidjo’s insistence - to refer the whole issue
of border demarcation to the UN for international arbitration. Later on, Nigeria
discovered that an oil rig that had been set up by Cameroun in the Calabar
channel had not been removed. When Nigeria protested, Ahidjo explained that the
rig was inactive but was only being “serviced.” He later said he was willing to
concede the Calabar Channel to Nigeria in its entirety (as some members of the
Nigerian delegation had wanted in 1971). In return he wanted Cameroon-based
companies to be able to prospect for oil within the channel just around the rig
located one kilometer east of the Calabar Fairway Buoy. It was to resolve the
implications of Ahidjo’s new proposal regarding the maritime frontier that Gowon
met with Ahidjo at Maroua on May 31st 1975. The line of
delineation – marked on Chart 3433 - was known as the “Maroua Declaration.”
Some lower level officials of both nations met on June 1st to discuss
the wording of a “Joint Communique. ” The Cameroonians, led by Samuel Libook
wanted a reference to the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty to be included in the one of
the paragraphs in order to protect the freedom of shipping by either nation in
the channel. The Nigerians, led by Ambassador Iyalla preferred otherwise, saying
that agreements between independent African nations ought not to be guided by
pacts between colonial powers – a point, nonetheless, that was tacitly at
variance with existing OAU resolutions. Unable to reach agreement, the matter
was referred to the two Heads of State. The new line of maritime frontier
demarcation proceeded from Point 12 at the terminal of the line agreed on in
1971 and terminated at Point G, at the extreme southerly point on Chart 3433
accepted by both countries. In the view of diplomats present, the newly defined
line of demarcation secured the freedom of the Calabar channel, considered vital
to Nigeria’s security interests.
As previously noted, although Gowon was not
personally corrupt, some persons in his regime allegedly engaged in corrupt
practices. For example, by the time of the coup, the average commercial
property holding of his Governors was estimated at about 8 houses each in
the range of N49,000 – N120,000, along with farming estates. This was a big
deal at that time, although, using standards of Nigerian corruption in
subsequent regimes, Gowon’s Governors were, in retrospect, Boy Scouts, as far as
stealing is concerned.
Nevertheless, like many regimes that came after,
he did make an initial and ongoing effort to be seen combating corruption, such
as with the Investigation of Assets Decree No. 37 of 1968 and subsequent efforts
to investigate and punish deep seated post-war corruption in the military. It
was also, in 1973, during Gowon’s regime, that the Police (under Alhaji Kam
Salem) established the “X-Squad”. It was specifically designed to investigate
fraud, both in the public and private sectors. Interestingly, the X-Squad, in
its early years, unmasked many scandals. What I am unclear about is how many
cases were successfully prosecuted.
For example, using the technique of
over-invoicing, construction materials were often bought outside the country by
public servants and contractors at exorbitant prices. The difference between
the purchase price and true market value was then expropriated. Even the
practice of importing expired drugs was already well established.
In March 1974, an international hemp trafficking
scandal occurred. Ms. Iyabo Olorunkoya mentioned the names of Brigadiers Sotomi
and Adekunle in court papers in the UK. Although they claimed innocence and
denied some salacious details, both Brigadiers were retired by Gowon from the
Army after she was convicted – reportedly under pressure from their embarrassed
military colleagues.
Even more important for Gowon’s image, however,
was what took place in July 1974. One Mr. Godwin Daboh – allegedly instigated
by Paul Unongo and Benue-Plateau State Governor Joseph Gomwalk - wrote open
letters to Federal Communications Commissioner Joseph Tarka who, along with the
others, was also from Gowon’s home state of Benue-Plateau. He followed the open
letters with an affidavit in court alleging corruption. Tarka – a political
juggernaut of the middle belt - was eventually hounded by the Press into
resigning from office on August 1st, 1974. In a subsequent Daily
Times newspaper article, however, it was revealed that Tarka had initially
resisted resigning because ‘If I resign, it will set off a chain of reactions
of various events, the end of which nobody could foretell.’
A month later, on August 31st, a
protégé of Tarka, one Mr. Aper Aku accused Benue-Plateau Governor Gomwalk of
corruption in an affidavit filed at the Jos High Court. Before that he had
written several letters to Gomwalk and Gowon alleging corruption against Gomwalk.
After the affidavit, Aku was arrested for public incitement. But Gomwalk was
also called to Lagos to defend himself against the charges.