continued from: http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui29.htm
By
Nowa Omoigui
THE 16th BRIGADE’S BREAKOUT FROM
ENCIRCLEMENT
In his fine book “Epic Retreats – From 1776 to the
Evacuation of Saigon” Stephen Tanner analyses retreat under pressure in seven
military campaigns. They are General George Washington’s retreat from New York
in 1776 during the American revolution, Napoleon’s retreat from Russia in 1812,
and the great retreat of the Nez Perce Indians of the American West in 1877.
Others are the evacuation of British expeditionary troops from Dunkirk in 1940,
retrograde operations of the 1st Panzer army in the Caucasus in 1942,
and the harrowing retreat of the American 8th Army from the Pusan
perimeter in Korea in late 1950. Lastly, he reviewed the chaotic evacuation of
Saigon in 1975 by American forces retreating from Vietnam.
However, the specific accounts of fighting
withdrawals discussed in Tanner’s excellent book are by no means the only great
examples from which serious students of military history can draw lessons. In
my humble opinion, two specific examples of breakouts from encirclement deserve
particular emphasis. They are:
1. The breakout of General W. J. Slim’s Burma
Corps from Japanese encirclement at Rangoon and 900 mile retreat to Imphal (in
India) under pressure in 1942.
2. The break out of the 1st US Marine
Division under Brigadier General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller from Chinese
encirclement at the Chosin reservoir, under sub-arctic conditions in mountainous
terrain during the Korean War, between November 27th and December 9th,
1950.
It is with these accounts, among others at the
back of my mind, that I now return to the subject of this essay.
Choices open to the 16th Brigade at
Owerri
Faced with encirclement, the 16th
Brigade had a number of choices.
First, they could continue their attack
northwards, deep along the original axes hoping to attain the initial grand
objectives of ‘Operation OAU’ and relieve their sister Brigades in the process.
As noted previously, this option was briefly pursued and then terminated.
Secondly, they could hold their position in Owerri
and environs and defend encircled, as they did for many months. This was based
not only on their original operational orders in September 1968 but also the
direction of AHQ, confirmed by a “stand and fight” radio signal from the C-in-C,
Major General Gowon himself in February 1969. It did seem that higher national
pride (not to mention the need to maintain the aura of the 3MCDO and protect
Colonel Adekunle’s image) was involved in the decision not to allow Owerri to be
abandoned. Military factors in favor of this option included the built in
advantage of defending an urban area, equipped with armored vehicles (which the
besieging Biafrans did not have). These vehicles included Saracen Armoured
Personnel Carriers, Ferret and Saladin Armored cars, which gave Etuk a fire
power and mobility advantage using “interior lines” for rapid support by force
transfer from his core support area of all round front-line positions in the
“hedgehog”. In any case, if and when he had to break out he could rupture
the encirclement by sheer armored force. In support of this optimistic thinking
was the initial assumption that the Brigade could be supported by air,
reinforced and relieved before certain destruction by the Biafran armed
forces. The absence of Biafran air power and the curious initial Biafran
strategy of attacking with one infantry Brigade at a time from only one
direction in a sequential manner rather than a simultaneous all round assault
encouraged such thinking. All Etuk had to do was “jab” with his front-line
infantry positions and support artillery before delivering a powerful
“counter-punch” using armored vehicles concentrated on the attacking force at
the point of threatened penetration. The last factor that gave Etuk initial
confidence was the federal effort to para-drop supplies, supported by occasional
strafing and bombing of Biafran positions by NAF L-29, Mig-17 and Ilyushin
fighter jets and bombers.
However, the Biafrans soon settled in for an
alternative strategy. In between infantry assaults, harassing artillery fire and
long range snipers gradually reduced the 16th Brigade by continuous external
pressure through attrition. This approach enabled the besieging Biafran units
to conserve men and perhaps redeploy them for emergencies in other fronts. But
it had the disadvantage of using up a lot of ammunition in an endless orgy of
repeated bombardments, which, although murderous and highly effective, were
ultimately insufficient to compel Etuk to surrender. It also allowed the siege
to drag on. The “penetration” attempt by Colonel Achuzia failed because it used
only one frontal axis. Eventually, 14 Division Commander, Colonel Ogbugo Kalu,
supported by Major General Madiebo, armed with intimate knowledge of Etuk’s
hopeless situation, correctly chose to attack, penetrate and exploit along
multiple converging axes with little fear that Etuk – desperately short of men
and supplies - could inflict punishment in retaliation. This combination of
fire and maneuver eventually forced Etuk to choose between surrender,
displacement, or complete destruction. When that point was reached, then Lt.
Col. EA Etuk, with the support of his second-in-command, Major AT Hamman,
decided they would ignore the suicidal orders of the 3MCDO HQ and AHQ to “hold
until relieved.” They decided they would either break out or exfiltrate to the
rear, in the direction of friendly 3MCDO forces.
Indeed, Biafran sources are of the opinion that
Etuk considered this line of action at least three times. Two of these occurred
in March when he first realized encirclement was total on or about March 7th,
and then later in the month had to beat back ferocious efforts by the “S”
Division to penetrate and divide his forces. Russian and German forces often
did this to encircled enemy units during WW2. However, on each occasion
impatient Biafran units rushed into the Owerri pocket in frontal pursuit to take
advantage, only to be badly beaten back when Etuk suddenly reconfigured his
armor for counter-attack.
There is some evidence that Biafran units used the
technique of selective reduction of strong points. On February 10th,
for example, Ojukwu claims that 500 Russian automatic rifles and 100 boxes of
ammunition were secured from one of the 16th Brigade’s defensive
positions. Madiebo does not, however, make any comment that such a vast haul of
weapons was secured. In any case, organized systematic selective reduction
targeted at large groups of key battlefield assets did not occur. This would
have involved choosing one of Etuk’s main ‘teeth’ arm detachments, such as
armor, for example, (or artillery) and then destroying that first (as a whole)
before focusing on other combat and combat support elements. One reason was that
Etuk usually withdrew his armored vehicles back into center of the Owerri pocket
after using them for a counter-attack. He never left them open. The other
reason was the shortage of appropriate anti-tank weaponry. It does, however,
seem that there were efforts at reduction by infiltration which involved
penetrating the perimeter with small commando units designed to isolate small
elements of the 16th brigade from their parent unit.
During pauses between attacks, such as was the
case when Ojukwu called off Achuzia’s penetration attack, Biafran Commanders
supported their attrition strategy with continuous reconnaissance probes and
psychological operations (psyops). Examples of psyops include the case of the
female Captain who regularly showed up in full view of federal troops to
hail “Biafra Kwenu” and the choice of nighttime to do most of the shelling of
federal positions in Owerri. In addition, inadvertently routing the final
approach to over-fly Owerri of early morning relief aircraft bringing ammunition
to Uli-Ihiala airstrip before daybreak sent an unmistakable message to the
besieged forces. They also had to live with the knowledge that most of the
federal para-dropped ammunition and food meant for them were going to their
tormentors. They even had to fight for the little they got! Then there were
the sniper shots, slowly but surely killing all the leadership figures in the
Brigade. All of this was backed up by electronic measures such as federal
communications interception. On the flip side, Ojukwu visited Biafran units
besieging Owerri at least twice in the month of March, raising morale and
getting involved in tactical decisions.
On the federal side and international front, other
developments ultimately impacted the Owerri situation. At the February
meeting in Lagos of divisional commanders mentioned earlier, a semblance of
coordination was urged. But deep mistrust and rivalry remained. Colonel
Adekunle, for example, did not tell his fellow divisional commanders (ie
Colonels Shuwa and Ibrahim Haruna) in the 1st and 2nd
divisions the full extent of his Owerri dilemma. Instead, the meeting focused
on resolving the question of which Division would be given the task of taking
Umuahia, following Adekunle’s disaster in October 1968 when he tried doing so on
his own to beat Shuwa to it and end the war.
Therefore, rather than instructing the 1st
Division to relieve the 16th Brigade directly by attacking Owerri
from Okigwe which is 30 miles away (as the crow flies) in the north-easterly
direction, Shuwa was told to veer southwest to take Umuahia, then administrative
capital of Biafra. This clarified an old dispute with Adekunle but did not
directly address the Owerri situation. In retrospect, although Umuahia was
highly significant, if Shuwa had successfully attacked Owerri (rather than
Umuahia) in early 1969, in coordination with a southern assault on Owerri from
Port Harcourt by 3MCDO, both divisions would have relieved the beleaguered 16th
Brigade. They would also have divided Biafra into two, separating the Biafran
capital at Umuahia from its resupply airfield at Uli-Ihiala in the west.
Chances are that the war – with its horrendous losses - may have been shorter.
The fall of Umuahia to the 1st Division
will be discussed in detail in a future essay. In summary, Colonel Shuwa tasked
the commanders of 1 and 2 Sectors (later called Brigades) of the 1st
Division to take Umuahia and Bende respectively. Under the command of 1 Sector
Commander, Lt. Col. ADS Wya, the plan for the fall of Umuahia – code-named
Operation Leopard - was drawn up by his Brigade Major, Major Abdullahi Shelleng
and the Sector Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (DAQMG), Major Mamman
Jiya Vatsa.
Meanwhile, the other brigades of Adekunle’s 3MCDO
division had reorganized and recaptured
Mkpom, Usung-Ubum, Ikot-Abia and Ikot Obom on February 3rd, followed
on March 20th and 27th by the recapture of Umudike and Aba
Ala earlier lost in the Biafran counter-offensive of 1968. The Colonel General
Staff at 3MCDO HQ at this time was Major George Innih while Lt. Col. Emmanuel
Abisoye, a former 2 Sector Commander with the 1st Division, was in
charge of 3MCDO (rear) in Lagos, securing supplies for front-line units “by any
means necessary”.
On March 27, 1969, with the support of a squadron
of armored vehicles under Captain Garba Duba, 11 Field Squadron of Nigerian Army
Engineers under Captain Gida Inakusu, “Q” Battery of Nigerian Army Artillery
under Captain AB Mamman, and 1 Field Ambulance, five infantry battalions
launched the assault on Umuahia. These battalions, namely the 4th,
21st, 25th, 44th, and 82nd were
commanded by Major Ado Mohammed (later
replaced by Lt. Steve Samaila Yombe), Major YY Kure, Lt. Balarabe Haladu, Major
IB Babangida (later replaced by Major MJ Vatsa) and Major Ibrahim Bako
respectively. NAF fighter-bombers later assisted in close air-support although
there were a few unfortunate incidents of deadly ‘NAF friendly fire’ at Abriba
and Uzuakoli.
A Zambian
delegation had visited Biafra from March 13 – 15 followed two weeks later by the
British PM’s visit to Nigeria. When the objective of ‘Operation Leopard’ became
evident, Ojukwu started desperately mobilizing soldiers and resources from all
corners of what remained of Biafra (including Owerri) to save Umuahia,
eventually stalling but not stopping Col. ADS Wya’s advance in two weeks of
fierce fighting. During the time, nevertheless, Ezi Alayi, Ovim, Amoyi, Ndi
Ihube, Uzuakoli, Isikwuato, Umuokorola and Bende fell to the 1st
Division, while elements of the 3rd MCDO took back Umuomayi and
Okuenyi on April 4th. This was followed by the recapture of Obetete
on April 5th which had been lost only 24 hours earlier. On April 13th,
3MCDO lost Obokwe again, typical of its extremely labile situation since October
1968.
Beginning
with his visit to Uzuakoli, followed by the precautionary evacuation of the
Biafran government from Umuahia to Nkwerre, near Orlu on April 4th up
until the fall of Bende on April 14th, Ojukwu became increasingly
concerned about the fate of Umuahia, where his bunker was located. According to
Madiebo:
“By the 14th of April, it had become
obvious judging from the situation on the ground, that Umuahia was going to be
lost. It was also clear that such an event would destroy completely the will
of the Biafran people to continue the war. It was then that Colonel Ojukwu told
me of the need to revive the Owerri operation on the off-chance that we might
score a victory there to counter-balance the loss of Umuahia. The idea was to
share the few resources available into two to try and clear what was left of
Owerri before it was too late. The whole idea was a calculated risk worth
taking if the Head of State who alone knew what ammunition the nation had,
thought so.
On the 18th of April, therefore, the
Owerri operations were reopened. As I was still at Umuahia, I did not know
exactly what was available for the offensive. However, the plan of the
operation which was sent to me for approval, showed that the 60 Brigade was
again to clear the right side of the town up to the Clock Tower and including
the Holy Ghost College, the Catholic Cathedral and the Progress Hotel. The 52
Brigade, now under Major Igweze, was to have another go at Orji and the northern
part of the town, down to the Public Works Department and the Government
Secondary School. Elements of “S” Division under command of 14 Division in the
absence of Onwuatuegwu, who was still at Umuahia, had the task of advancing
through Egbu and Nekede into Owerri, as far as to the motor park.”
Far away in
Monrovia, Liberia, the OAU consultative committee was meeting on April 17th.
No one knew that history was about to be made on an African battlefield.
Remnants of the 16th Brigade of the 3MCDO that had held Owerri since
September 16, 1968 and was at least partially cut off for almost six months
since November 1st, and totally besieged since March 14th,
were about to break out. Etuk was finally persuaded not just by Biafra’s
equally historic final offensive to retake Owerri, an act that in turn had been
prompted by the impending fall of Umuahia to federal units under Col. ADS Wya,
but by what transpired inside Owerri on April 19th.
April 19th,
1968: The Final DC-3 overflight and death of Major A Ted Hamman
On April 19th,
Captain Francis Mokonogho and his DC-3 crew lifted off from Port Harcourt
airport for yet another routine tactical airdrop over Owerri. But, unknown to
them, fate beckoned. They flew right into a Biafran offensive. Biafran
anti-aircraft gunners were no longer in the mood to accept the free aerial gifts
from the federal government, nor were they going to allow Etuk the luxury of any
more ammunition or food, no matter how small. Thus, they shot at the plane
furiously, forcing Mokonogho to abort its final approach and turn around to Port
Harcourt with its cargo. He barely made it back. The DC-3 was badly riddled
with bullet holes. It would be the last attempt by the 3MCDO to resupply its
beleaguered brigade.
Back in Owerri, Etuk, now at his wit’s end, was
faced with the penetration of Biafran units, so close in one axis that they were
nearly upon his HQ. He called his trusted second in command and Brigade Major (Hamman)
aside for urgent consultations. They agreed – without reference to 3MCDO HQ or
AHQ - that a last ditch effort to breakout towards the rear with all they had
was only the only credible option. Surrender was out of the question.
As of this
time, the surviving troops of the 16th brigade had acquired the
“thousand yard stare.” As described by a survivor of the American break out
from the Chosin reservoir in Korea, the stare results from a combination of
tiredness, sleeplessness, and fear, combined, paradoxically, with a strong will
to survive. When men get into that condition, they are fighting for no one but
themselves and their buddies, not any country or imaginary ideal. For many
months, the Brigade had endured chronic sleep deprivation, repeated mortar and
105mm artillery barrages, short, but repeated violent firefights back and forth
in and out of foxholes and buildings with shot guns, rifles and machine guns.
Practically every building in the town had been destroyed. Then there were the
deaths of numerous colleagues, impromptu burials, personal injuries, near death
experiences, rain, hunger, cold, heat, insect bites, separation from family, the
emotional highs and lows of relief over-flights and DC-3 air drops, the stench,
and worst of all, a suspicion that they had been abandoned.
According to
Colonel Etuk (rtd),
“My decision to
withdraw wasn’t proper. The Army Headquarters should [ordinarily] give me the
go-ahead but I did [without authority] and said let me be court-martialled when
I am out with my troops. [If] I didn’t do that, it would have meant complete
elimination of the whole troops and that was what Ojukwu was waiting to do. If
not through hunger it would have been through torture by whatever means he chose
to use. But the Army Headquarters did little or nothing to get me as a Brigade
Commander out of that place. What sort of battle organization is that? So I
said to myself, ‘When I come out let them put me on trial.’ But they didn’t do
it; maybe they knew that that was the only way to save the few lives I was able
to…..”
“…..the rebels had
penetrated into the town where my headquarters was situated and so the firing
was so close; as we are sitting here you will just hear deafening sounds. One
should not stay at a position for too long for the time may turn out to be
enough for the enemy to kill you….”
“So one
Sunday morning, when the rebels were almost at my headquarters and we were doing
nothing because there was nothing we could do then – no ammunition, the men were
gone, no weapons – I called the attention of others and said to them:
“We have
to pull out of this place to see what we can do next week to save a few lives
remaining”
So we set out towards
Emmanuel College. We were all determined to get out of the place, be it a cook,
a washerman; in fact, every one of us with or without a weapon. As we left,
within 30 minutes after the decision, I heard a cry,
“Oga, come oh! Oga come
oh! Dem don kill Oga oh!”
Behold, he
was shot right there. The man was gasping for breath. He had a very large
wound. If the road had been opened and if we had immediate medical attention,
possibly his life might have been saved. There weren’t even drugs. The doctor
I had was just sitting and watching while the man died.
“…before the poor boy
died, he [Major Hamman] said,
“Oga, Allah, Allah, if
I see Adekunle I will finish him. Adekunle is the man that has caused this.”
Coming as it
did at the tail end of the siege, after a preliminary decision had been made to
plan a break out, the death of the competent and popular Major Ted Hamman was
absolutely devastating for unit morale. It stretched the cohesion of the unit
to the limit and sorely tested the command and leadership skills of Etuk. The
next day, April 20, 1969, Ojukwu made an entry in his diary, documenting the
Biafran interception of weak federal radio transmissions from Owerri alerting
3MCDO HQ of Major AT Hamman’s death. However, 3MCDO HQ did not notify AHQ of
the development. For the Biafran side, Hamman’s death was a signal that before
long the 16th brigade might simply collapse.
Meanwhile,
according to Colonel Etuk (rtd):
“The death of that
young man forced me to take a decision of praying to God that if He is the God
that delivered the children of Israel from Egypt then He should deliver my
troops. Of course, God delivered us.”
Having left
the decision to break out until so late in the game, the 16th Brigade
was in the unenviable position of attempting it when already severely drained of
its human and material resources.
Then Lt. Col.
Etuk’s first priority was to determine possible escape routes through weak
points and gaps in Biafran lines while at the same continuing to give the
impression that he was maintaining all round defence. The timing would have to
be precise to prevent the encircling forces from sealing off his escape route or
launching a final all-out offensive against him before he had the time to
escape. The other potential problem was that since either 3MCDO HQ or AHQ had
not actually ordered the breakout, there would be no coordinated assistance from
friendly external forces outside the Owerri pocket. Nor could prospective plans
be made for a link-up at that stage of the game. To compound matters, it is not
clear that Etuk was reliably informed while in isolation at Owerri, of ongoing
federal military operations outside the Owerri area or the precise locations of
federal units. He knew that his sector commander – Colonel Godwin Ally – was
based in Port Harcourt, but he also knew that all along the route to Port
Harcourt, Biafran soldiers had the habit of wearing the Nigerian uniforms of
dead Nigerian soldiers.
Another big
problem was what to do with enemy civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) as well
as wounded and dead Nigerian soldiers - from recent skirmishes or sniper
activity - who had not yet been buried. To leave the civilians and POWs behind
would simply create an opportunity for the betrayal of operational security. To
shoot them would be illegal and counter-productive, since they may well be
useful as “human shields”. As for the dead body of his second-in-command, Major
AT Hamman, unit morale and officer bond demanded that he take it along. Thus,
Etuk decided to take everyone along. The corpse of the late Major Hamman was
entrusted to one Captain Buhari, a former NCO who had served in Enugu before the
war.
To mislead
the Biafrans, Etuk aligned his vehicles in a manner that suggested a breakout
along the main road. Then he decided to launch the effort in the early morning
hours before sunrise to exploit the limited visibility.
In the course
of all the months of defensive fighting throwing back Biafran attacks from all
directions, Etuk had made a number of important observations based on his early
warning systems and reconnaissance reports. Man being a creature of habit, he
noticed that there was an axis from which the Biafrans had not attacked for a
long time. Along this bush track there was an old bridge – the only one
leading to the town. Although a retrograde assault river crossing is by no
means an easy operation he elected to use it. He reasoned that it would be an
unexpected route – thus exploiting the principle of surprise – and if it
succeeded it gave him the best chance of avoiding confrontation with strong
Biafran units in the perimeter.
The first
step, therefore, was to establish the feasibility of using the planned route.
Elements of the Engineer Squadron attached to the Brigade were sent to
reconnoiter the bridge. Not surprisingly, they discovered that it was heavily
mined with explosives and returned to Etuk to report their finding. He then
ordered them back to the bridge under cover of darkness to disarm the
explosives.
According to
Etuk:
“They came
back sometime later saying they had a successful operation. The news made me
happy because it meant that I had boys who were ready to fight. They said that
if we could just cross the river, then we could fight our way all through.”
Once this was
accomplished on April 24th, 1969, Etuk decided it was time to move.
Preoccupied with his own travails, he may have missed the big news that at 1500
hours on April 22nd, the 21 Battalion under Major YY Kure and 44
Battalion under Major MJ Vatsa, both of the 1st Division entered the
abandoned town of Umuahia – Biafra’s erstwhile capital.
Late that
night (24th/25th), Etuk called his boys and gave the
formal order for the Owerri break out. Excess ammunition that could not be
taken along was buried. Strict radio silence was to be maintained. The force
was organized with armor and artillery leading as the perimeter rupture or
breakout force in front of the main body of the convoy. Meanwhile infantry
elements folding back from their positions along the perimeter to join the
convoy were instructed to fight rearguard and flank action to delay and
frustrate any Biafran counter-attack. An infantry and engineer detachment was
told to secure the far end of the riverbank to protect the vital crossing site
during the initial stage of breakout. Because of the lack of resources there
were no diversionary attacks. It was all based on speed, momentum, surprise and
stealth.
But the
element of surprise was not total. Biafran forward observers from besieging
units knew something was up, although they failed to anticipate the precise
route of breakout via a disused old road track. Fate and luck also played a
role. Etuk may have been helped by a decision made by Madiebo not to attack the
breakout force inside Owerri. Madiebo was concerned that Etuk might
suddenly reconfigure and use his armored vehicles with deadly effect – as he had
done in the past.
According to
Madiebo:
“Right from the very start of his operation, it
was clear the enemy was beginning to feel the bite of his over four months of
isolation inside Owerri town. Everywhere his resistance was stiff but
shortlived and mainly sustained with armoured vehicles. From the four corners
of Owerri, our troops gradually closed in, and even began to set up road blocks
in parts of Owerri. Yet in the part of the town the enemy occupied, it was
still impossible to break through the armour barrier. That was the situation
when I returned to Owerri front in the evening of the 23rd of April,
1969, following the fall of Umuahia the previous day. The first report I got on
my arrival was that the enemy at Owerri had lined up all his vehicles facing
southwards, in a manner suggesting a withdrawal. After a very lengthy
discussion of the situation with the Division Commander, I decided it would be
better to allow the enemy to leave the town and then attack him somewhere out of
Owerri, at a point where we still stood a chance of destroying him. I thought
that for us to put in everything we had against the enemy inside the town could
result in our exhausting our limited resources without success, and then run a
risk of losing a large part of the town which we already controlled. For that
reason, a battalion of 60 Brigade was despatched to Umuguma to wait for the
enemy. To encourage the enemy to start the move we began to shell his convoy at
a very slow rate with the little quantity of bombs we had. During the month of
March, the enemy had on two occasions similarly lined up his vehicles to
withdraw from Owerri. On each of those occasions, we had attacked him and it
had resulted in his redeploying to defend himself and successfully too. This
time we were not going to attack him and therefore hoped that he would not
change his mind.
During the night of the 24th of April
the enemy began to move out of Owerri to the uncontrollable joy of all. Once
out of town, a Biafran company was put on their trail to harass them and hasten
the withdrawal. At Umuguma, the major battle began on the morning of the 25th
and the enemy suffered very heavy casualties indeed. Many vehicles carrying
women, children and enemy casualties were allowed to proceed on their journey
southwards unmolested. After 24 hours of heavy fighting the enemy shifted
further down to Avu, only to face another biafran force waiting for them there.
After barely four hours encounter at Avu, the enemy moved again further south to
Ohoba and there linked up with his counterparts advancing from the south.
Thereafter all attempts to move him again failed, in the same way as did all his
attempts to move back from there into Owerri.”
Etuk recalls
it differently. According to him:
“I called my officers
and told them, ‘This morning I am calling you, telling you, giving you directive
as your Commander that we are leaving Owerri by 6 o’oclock. If you like follow
me; if you like stay here;” they laughed and retorted, ‘Oga don come oh! Ah! Oga.
Wey the men now to fight the rebels? Wey the weapon? Wey the ammunition?” I
said, ‘Don’t you worry, we are going.’”
So by 6
o’clock we decided to take off; all of us, men, women, rebel prisoners of war
etc. We all moved out of Owerri. I said within my mind that this is what they
call American wonder. Let them sit and wait for me at the tarred road while I
use track. There was no time to waste and before long we linked up with
[Colonel] Godwin Ally.”
The link-up
was not without high drama, however. After rupturing the encirclement, the main
body of the convoy moved out in front of the original mechanized rupture
force. As noted previously, the main danger was determining how to distinguish
Nigerian from Biafran troops wearing Nigerian uniforms. While the women and
children were out in front, Etuk and his troops were behind assessing the
situation ready to fire if necessary.
According to
him:
“…it became so nasty
that you wouldn’t know who was who. With the assistance of my binoculars I was
able to sight troops standing up there; soldiers moving around and it was
difficult for me to know whether they were friendly troops or rebels…….
I had to send my
intelligence officer to disguise himself as a hunter with a note to [Colonel]
Ally that when I wave my hand he should wave and I would know it was a friendly
force. Because at this time there was no question of saying there was connection
in terms of radio, no! We were all saying ‘life or death let us face
whichever.’ So by the time this young man got there and gave him the note all I
saw was a wave of hand as arranged….”
But there was
one final surprise for the survivors of the 16th Brigade
encirclement. When they got back to their mother division in Port Harcourt,
they discovered that their identity had been changed. Colonel Adekunle had
written off the 16 Brigade as totally lost and created a brand new unit called
the ’16 Infantry Commando Brigade.’ Etuk and his boys were told that they were
all presumed dead. Needless to say, the men went berserk.
The exact
date Owerri was lost was not reported to AHQ by the 3MCDO. On April 26th
1969, the BBC announced the previous day’s recapture of Owerri by Biafran
troops. That was how Major General Gowon and the AHQ in Lagos found out about it
on radio in Lagos.
According to
Major General Oluleye (rtd), it was only after a confrontation between then
Colonels Shuwa and Adekunle of the 1st and 3rd divisions
respectively, at an Army conference in Lagos, that the GOC 3MCDO admitted that
Owerri had fallen.
According to
Major General Shuwa (rtd),
"When
Adekunle heard that Umuahia was taken, instead of telling me, "Thank you, well
done!” he now asked, "Why did you take Umuahia?"
Shuwa turned
to the gathering of senior army officers and said,
"Here is the
map, Adekunle should show us where his troops are in Owerri.”
He was
sitting down.
“Show us
where your troops are."
General
Hassan asked why I was demanding that. I said:
'Sir, I have
been trying to get these boys on their wireless; by now I don't think we have
any boy left in that town. The last time I heard human talking was three days
ago. I think these boys are gone. We have lost them."
So Hassan
said: "Please Adekunle, show us where the boys are." He said they were about
10-15 Kilometers outside the town.
I said, "Sir,
there is no truth in that."
Hassan said:
" You are in Enugu. How do you know that these boys were gone."
I said,
"Okay, find out."
Adekunle
finished talking. So I went to the telephone and was ringing the Brigade Head
[Commander] for Hassan."
Hassan
commented, "I Division is telling us to tell the world that we lost."
I said, "No
Sir. You don’t do it like that oh!"
He had to
announce on network that for tactical reasons the 3 Marine Commando pulled out
of Owerri and actually we did. There was a routing and 90% of our boys died...
“
Lamenting
then Colonel Adekunle’s lack of candidness about the conditions within his
Division and unwillingness to seek assistance, Shuwa said:
“Now, if
he was so pressed and he knew he was not going to be able to extricate himself
by himself; if he said, look, 1 Division, you must try as much as you can and
push towards me so that you may relieve pressure on me, we could have, instead
of going to Umuahia, pushed toward Owerri and could have relieved the pressure.
I [had] the troops. I [had] the ammunition. I didn’t see the reason why I
should sit down [doing nothing] and I was familiar with the ground."
Then Colonel
Adekunle on the other hand, may have been misguided by other considerations.
According to him, he often misinformed the Army HQ,
“Because in the first
instance you [they] want the glory of the Civil War to go to the North alone.
That the North alone will say we saved this country. That you [they] didn’t
believe in any other person being able to do it”